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Casenote

Definitely Not Harmless: The Supreme
Court Holds that the Erroneous
Disqualification of Retained Counsel
Warrants Automatic Reversal in United
States v. Gonzalez-Lopez

In United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,' the United States Supreme Court
held that the erroneous disqualification of a criminal defendant's
retained choice of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment2 to the United
States Constitution and must result in the automatic reversal of the
defendant's conviction.3 In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected
the Government's argument that a defendant who is denied his choice
of counsel must prove prejudice by showing the defendant's substitute
counsel was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington.4 Instead, the Court concluded that because a complete violation of
the Sixth Amendment's Counsel Clause occurs when a defendant is
deprived of his right to counsel of choice, proving prejudice is unneces-

1.
2.
3.
4.

126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2566.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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sary.' Gonzalez-Lopez is an important decision because the Court's
holding will deter trial judges from exercising their discretion in
disqualifying attorneys due to scheduling conflicts, ethical violations, or
conflicts of interest because trial judges will fear being reversed on
appeal. Additionally, the decision in Gonzalez-Lopez is at odds with the
Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and is limited to those
defendants with retained counsel, not court-appointed counsel, which
illustrates the Court's willingness to treat rich and poor defendants
disparately.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez's family hired an attorney, John Fable,
to represent him on charges of conspiracy to distribute over one hundred
kilograms of marijuana in the Eastern District of Missouri. After being
arraigned, Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, a California attorney, to
represent him but did not fire Fahle. Fahle and Low represented
Gonzalez-Lopez during an evidentiary hearing before a magistrate judge,
who granted Low a provisional entry of appearance on the condition that
However, the
Low immediately file for admission pro hac vice.
when Low
acceptance
provisional
Lows
magistrate judge rescinded
violated a court rule during the hearing.6
Gonzalez-Lopez fired Fahle a week later, informing the court that Low
would be his sole attorney. Low filed two applications for admission pro
hac vice, which the court denied twice without comment. Low appealed
by filing a writ of mandamus, which was 7dismissed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Fahle moved to withdraw as counsel for Gonzalez-Lopez and for a
show-cause hearing to consider sanctions against Low for violating the
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct.8 Low moved to strike Fahle's
motion, which the district court denied. The court granted Fahle's
motion to withdraw, granted a continuance so Gonzalez-Lopez could find
new representation, and explained its rationale for rejecting Low's
motions for admission pro hac vice-in a previous case, Low violated the
Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct.9
Although Gonzalez-Lopez wanted Low to represent him, the case
proceeded to trial with Gonzalez-Lopez being represented by Karl
Dickhaus, a local attorney. Low moved a third time for admission, but

5. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562.
6. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2560 (2006).
7. Id.
8. Id. Fahle alleged Low had violated MO. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-4.2 (1995).
9. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2560.
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was unsuccessful. The court denied Dickhaus's request to have Low sit
at the counsel table with him, ordering Low to sit in the audience and
refrain from all contact with Dickhaus during the proceedings. A United
States Marshal sat between Low and Dickhaus to enforce the court's
instruction. During the trial, Low met with Gonzalez-Lopez only once,
the night before the trial ended. Ultimately, the jury returned a guilty
verdict.' °
Following trial, the district court granted Fahle's motions for sanctions
against Low." The court also reiterated that it denied Low's motions
for admission on 2the ground that Low had violated the same rule in a
separate matter.
Gonzalez-Lopez appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which vacated the conviction. The Eighth Circuit held that the district
court erred in denying Low's motions for admission because the district
court misinterpreted the Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct as
prohibiting Low's conduct.'" The court reasoned that the erroneous
denials of Low's motions for admission constituted a violation of
Gonzalez-Lopez's Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choosing and
was not subject to harmless-error review. 4 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide whether the erroneous disqualification
of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel violates the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution."
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Overview

A.

The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." 6 In England prior to 1836, a person charged with a
felony or treason was permitted the aid of counsel, whose sole purpose
was to answer legal questions posed by the defendant. 7 However,
persons charged with misdemeanors or who were parties to a civil case

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2560-61.
13. Id. at 2561.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 2560. The Court's majority observed that the Government had conceded the
district court erroneously deprived Gonzalez-Lopez of his right to counsel. Id. at 2563.
16.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

17. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932). This case is often referred to as the
"Scottsboro Boys Case."
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were entitled to the full assistance of counsel. 8 Of course, the English
common law rule was not without its critics. Blackstone denounced the
rule, writing that it was inconsistent with the remainder of English law
that provided for the humane treatment of prisoners. 9 In America,
twelve of the thirteen colonies rejected the English common law rule,
recognizing that the right to counsel should be available for all serious
criminal prosecutions. 20
Throughout the United States Supreme
Court's twentieth-century jurisprudence, the Court has frequently
examined the protections afforded to criminal defendants through the
Sixth Amendment. The Court's decision in Gonzalez-Lopez was merely
another attempt to clarify its meaning and scope.
B.

The Scope of the Sixth Amendment Prior to Gonzalez-Lopez

During the first half of the twentieth century, the United States
Supreme Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment confers upon a
criminal defendant the right to retain counsel as well as to have courtappointed counsel. The Court recognized this right in Johnson v.
Zerbst.2" There, the defendant appealed the denial of his writ of habeas
corpus. Prior to his incarceration, the defendant and his codefendant
were tried and convicted without the assistance of counsel for counterfeiting money.22 The Court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the
habeas petition,2" holding that in all criminal proceedings in federal
court where the penalty is the loss of life or liberty, the accused has the
right to the assistance of counsel unless the accused waives that
right.2 4 While the Court had previously recognized the right to the
assistance of counsel at trial was a fundamental right protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment, 5 the Court for the first time in Johnson
acknowledged that this same right is also protected by the Sixth
Amendment.

18. Id.
19. Id. (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 335
(1769)).
20. Id. at 64-65.
21. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22. Id. at 460.
23. Id. at 469.
24. Id. at 463.
25. See Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. In Powell the Court surveyed the thirteen colonies'
practices regarding a criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 61-64.
The Court noted that of the thirteen colonies, twelve fully recognized the right to counsel
in all criminal proceedings. Id. at 64-65. This led the Court to conclude that a federal or
state court's denial of the right to counsel would violate the defendant's right to due
process contained in the federal Constitution. Id. at 69.
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Although the Court in Johnson recognized that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the right to the assistance of counsel,
the Court had not yet extended the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to
indigent state court defendants in the absence of special circumstances.
Twenty-five years after Johnson, the Court in Gideon v. Wainwright2 6
held that a trial court's refusal to appoint counsel to an indigent
defendant pursuant to the Sixth Amendment violated the defendant's
The Court observed that "any person
right to due process of law."
haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."28 The majority turned to
language contained in Powell, decided thirty years earlier, to bolster its
expansive interpretation of the Sixth Amendment. Justice Black,
writing for the majority, quoted Justice Sutherland's rationale from
Powell, noting that "'[t]he right to be heard would be ... of little avail
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.'"2" Thus, the
Court had come full circle by fully incorporating the Sixth Amendment
to the states and ruling that regardless of socioeconomic status,
defendants in all criminal matters must be allowed the assistance of
counsel.
However, an indigent defendant's- Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel is not unlimited. In Morris v. Slappy, ° the Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's grant of a habeas corpus petition to a
defendant who complained that his constitutional rights were violated
when the trial court denied his motion for a continuance based upon the
substitution of one public defender for another."' The Ninth Circuit
held that the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant's right to a
"meaningful attorney-client relationship," 2 which the trial court
inhibited when it refused to consider allowing the defendant to be
But as the Court
represented by his original public defender.3
observed, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship was

26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
27. Id. at 339, 344 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 472,473 (1942), where the
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only requires courts
to appoint counsel to criminal defendants when extenuating circumstances exist that make
such an appointment necessary for the defendant to receive a fair trial).
28. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
29. Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
30. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
31. Id. at 3, 15.
32. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981).
33. Morris, 461 U.S. at 11.
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"without basis in the law."34 As a result, the Court ordered the court
of appeals to reinstate the district court's judgment denying the writ of
habeas corpus to the defendant."
The Court took the next step in broadening the protections of the
Sixth Amendment in Faretta v. California" by holding that the right
to self-representation is within the purview of the Sixth Amendment,
provided the defendant makes the decision to waive counsel voluntarily
and intelligently.3 7 In Faretta the defendant waived his right to
counsel despite the trial judge's belief that the waiver was a mistake.
Prior to the trial, the trial judge appointed a public defender to represent
the defendant, finding that Faretta had not intelligently and knowingly
waived his right to the assistance of counsel.38 Furthermore, the trial
judge decided Faretta did not have a constitutional right to conduct his
own defense. 9 The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
judge's decision, the California Supreme Court denied review, and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari."
In vacating the trial court's decision, 4 ' the Court observed that the
right to self-representation is grounded in the nation's legal history and
protected by the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Court's own jurisprudence,
and numerous state constitutions.4 2 Using these historical foundations
for support, the Court concluded that although the right to selfrepresentation is not explicitly contained in the Sixth Amendment, the
right can be inferred.43
The Court explored the purpose of the Sixth Amendment in more
detail in Wheat v. United States." There, the defendant was charged
with participating in a drug distribution conspiracy whereby he and his
codefendants imported thousands of pounds of marijuana from Mexico
into the United States. Prior to Wheat's trial, the prosecuting attorney
objected to Wheat's attempt to substitute his counsel for another

34. Id. at 13.
35. Id. at 15.
36. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
37. Id. at 807.
38. Id. at 808, 809-10.
39. Id. at 810.
40. Id. at 811-12.
41. Id. at 836.
42. Id. at 812, 816-17. However, the right to self-representation on appeal is not
protected by the Sixth Amendment. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
43. Faretta,422 U.S. at 818-19. As the Court pointed out, "To thrust counsel upon Can]
accused, against his considered wish, [would] violate[] the logic of the [Sixth] Amendment
....[Clounsel [would] not be an assistant, but a master." Id. at 820.
44. 486 U.S. 153 (1988).
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attorney who had obtained an acquittal for one of Wheat's codefendants.
The basis for the prosecuting attorney's objection was that the substitution would create a serious conflict of interest for the attorney Wheat
wanted. Wheat emphasized that he had the right to have counsel of his
own choosing and agreed to waive the conflict, but the prosecuting
attorney argued that by allowing the conflict, Wheat would be denied
effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, if he were convicted, his
conviction would surely be reversed on appeal. 4 The district court
denied the requested substitution, the case proceeded to trial with
Wheat's original counsel, and he was convicted. 4s The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the conviction, noting the trial court acted within its discretion
in denying Wheat's requested substitution.47
Because the courts of appeals were in disagreement as to when a
district court could override a criminal defendant's waiver of his
attorney's conflict of interest, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.4" Although the Court affirmed the court of appeals and held
that a presumption exists in favor of a defendant's choice of counsel,
which can be overcome by showing a serious potential for conflict, 49 the
Court's opinion is especially significant for what it said about the scope
of the Sixth Amendment. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, noted that while the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal
defendants the right to select who will represent them, this is not the
Amendment's central aim. ° Instead, the Sixth Amendment's purpose
"is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather
than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the
lawyer whom he prefers."5 '
Thus, throughout the last century, the Court has frequently sought to
clarify its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence by carefully examining the
Amendment's meaning and purpose. As is readily apparent in the
above-cited opinions, the Court frequently relies on historical precedent
for guidance in deciding which rights the Sixth Amendment actually
guarantees.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 154-56.
at 157.
at 158.
at 164.
at 159 (citing Morris, 461 U.S. at 13-14).
(citing Morris, 461 U.S. at 13-14).
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The Right to Appeal

Generally, the final judgment rule bars a defendant from appealing a
trial judge's decision until the defendant has been convicted.52 However, some pretrial orders may be appealed immediately prior to the entry
of final judgment because they are "'too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.' 5 3 This
exception is known as the collateral order doctrine.5 4 In Flanagan v.
United States,55 the United States Supreme Court held that a trial
judge's pretrial decision to disqualify a criminal defendant's chosen
counsel is not a collateral order subject to immediate appeal.56 There,
the Court distinguished a pretrial denial of counsel of choice from other
pretrial orders, stating that the pretrial disqualification of counsel of
choice will not become moot after the defendant is convicted and
sentenced.57 As the Court itself recognized, this approach allowed it to
avoid altogether the issue of whether the defendant must show the
disqualification order was prejudicial.5 8
D.

The Consequences of ConstitutionalErrors

The Supreme Court has created different remedies for constitutional
errors that occur at a defendant's criminal trial. Some constitutional
errors require the defendant to prove prejudice in order for the
conviction to be reversed. Conversely, some constitutional errors are so
significant that their presence at trial results in the automatic reversal
of the defendant's conviction. First, this section examines the Court's
adoption of the federal harmless error rule, which is generally used to
assess the gravity of constitutional errors. Second, this section examines
the two categories the Court has used to quantify constitutional errors
that occur at trial.
Generally, absent a showing of prejudice by the defendant, insignificant constitutional errors that occur at trial will not result in the
reversal of the defendant's conviction. In Chapman v. California,9 the

52.
53.
Corp.,
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

28 U.S.C. § 1291.(2000).
Will v. Hallock, 126 S. Ct. 952,957 (2006) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
Id.
465 U.S. 259 (1984).
Id. at 270.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 269.
386 U.S. 18 (1967).
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Supreme Court created the federal harmless error rule, which applies to
inconsequential constitutional errors that occur at trial.6 0 There, the
defendants were tried and convicted of robbing, kidnapping, and
murdering a bartender.6 1 Throughout the trial, the prosecutor frequently commented upon the defendants' choices not to testify, a
privilege granted to prosecutors by the California constitution. 2
Following their conviction but prior to appeal, the United States
Supreme Court decided Griffin v. California,"a where the Court
declared unconstitutional the portion of the California constitution that
permitted prosecutors to comment negatively on a defendant's decision
not to testify at trial.64
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the defendants argued
that any violation of their federal constitutional rights should result in
the automatic reversal of their conviction. 5 Ultimately, the Court
reversed the defendants' convictions, but refused to adopt their sweeping
Instead, the Court
approach to analyzing constitutional errors.6 6
decided that "unimportant and insignificant" constitutional errors that
have little or no likelihood of changing the result of the trial can be
deemed harmless and will not result in the reversal of a conviction. 7
A quarter of a century later in Arizona v. Fulminante,5 the Court
discussed the second category of constitutional errors-structural defects.
There, the Court divided constitutional errors that occur at trial into two
categories: (1) trial errors, which are subject to harmless error review
and require the defendant to prove prejudice and (2) structural defects,
which are not.69 Trial errors are those that occur "during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively
assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine
whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."7 °

60. Id. at 21-22.
61. Id. at 18-19.
62. Id. at 19.
63. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
64. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 19-20.
65. Id. at 20.
66. Id. at 21-22, 26.
67. Id. at 22. According to the Court's opinion, one who seeks to prove the harmlessness of a constitutional error must do so beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24.
68. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
69. Id. at 307-08, 309-10. The Court also uses the prejudice test for other types of
error. For example, the Court held in Strickland v. Washington that to prevail on an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show (1) that defense counsel's
performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
70. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08.
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Most constitutional errors are trial errors. These include an unconstitutionally overbroad jury instruction at the sentencing phase of a capital
case; a jury instruction containing an erroneous conclusive presumption;
the denial of the defendant's right to be present at trial; the denial of
counsel at a preliminary hearing in violation of the Sixth Amendment;
the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the presumption of
innocence; and numerous other errors committed by a trial judge.71
Conversely, a structural defect in a criminal defendant's trial is not
subject to the harmless error rule because the trial as a whole has been
tainted. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in Fulminante, structural
defects are those "affecting the framework within which the trial
72
proceeds" and are not merely "an error in the trial process itself."
The Court listed various structural defects in Neder v. United States.73
Those defects germane to the Sixth Amendment are the complete denial
of counsel and the denial of self-representation at trial. 4 Others
include a biased trial judge, race discrimination in grand jury selection,
the denial of a public trial, and a defective jury instruction as to
reasonable doubt. 75 Thus, because structural defects shake the trial to
the core, their presence indicates that the defenaant's constitutional
rights have been clearly violated.
As is clearly visible, the Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence has
evolved rapidly during the twentieth century. First, in Johnson the
Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment protects a criminal
defendant's right to counsel in the federal system.76 Years later, in the
landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court extended the
protections of the Sixth Amendment to all criminal defendants, whether
rich or poor, in all federal and state courts.7 7 Next, the Court in
Farettaexpanded the Sixth Amendment's Assistance Clause to include
the right to self-representation.78 Of course, the Assistance Clause is
not without its limits. The Sixth Amendment does not provide that
criminal defendants shall have a meaningful relationship with their
attorneys. 79 Nor does it permit a criminal defendant an unconditional
choice of counsel, especially where the choice will result in a conflict of

71. Id. at 306-07. The full text of the Court's opinion contains a more extensive list of
trial errors.
72. Id. at 310.
73. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id.
76. 334 U.S. at 463.
77. 372 U.S. at 339.
78. 422 U.S. at 818.
79. Morris, 461 U.S. at 13.
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interest between the chosen counsel and the criminal defendant.80 In
deciding United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,"' the Court deemed the
erroneous disqualification of a criminal defendant's chosen counsel to be
such a violation of the Sixth Amendment that its occurrence constituted
a structural defect in the trial, meriting an automatic reversal of the
conviction. 2
III.

COURT'S RATIONALE

In United States v.Gonzalez-Lopez, 3 the Court granted certiorari to
determine whether the erroneous disqualification of a criminal defendant's chosen counsel should result in the automatic reversal of the
defendant's conviction.' The Court held that it should. 8
The Majority's Opinion
Justice Scalia, who penned the majority opinion, broke from his usual
bloc when deciding in favor of reversal.8 8 After reviewing the facts, the
Court outlined the Government's argument: Gonzalez-Lopez had to show
that either (1) his substitute counsel was so deficient that he was
prejudiced or (2) the trial court's denial of his choice of counsel was
inherently prejudicial, even if the substitute counsel's representation was
adequate. 87 The Court summarized the Government's argument,
writing that "[a] trial is not unfair and thus the Sixth Amendment is not

A.

violated ... unless a defendant has been prejudiced." 8 As the Court

pointed out, the Government relied heavily on the Court's ineffective
assistance of counsel jurisprudence to support its argument, specifically
Strickland v. Washington.8 9
However, the Court distinguished a defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel from the right to select counsel.9" The Court
remarked that the former is derived from the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee to a fair trial, while the latter can be "regarded as the root

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164.
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
Id. at 2564, 2566.
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
Id. at 2560.
Id. at 2566.

86. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined in the majority opinion. Id.
at 2559. Justice Alito wrote a dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Id. at 2566.
87. Id. at 2561.
88. Id. at 2562.
89. Id. at 2561-63; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
90. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S.Ct. at 2562-63.
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meaning of the [Sixth Amendment's] constitutional guarantee." 91 This
difference meant a prejudice inquiry was unnecessary and inappropriate
because the "[dieprivation of the right [to choose] is 'complete' when the
defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer
he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received."9 2
Because the Government had previously conceded that the trial court's
disqualification of attorney Low was erroneous, 9 and because, as the
Court had already concluded, the erroneous deprivation of that right
constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment, 4 the limited issue
pending resolution by the Court was whether Sixth Amendment
violations are subject to review for harmlessness. 5 To decide that
issue, the Court resorted to the two categories of constitutional errors
s6
that it established in Arizona v. Fulninante.
Deciding that the
consequences of an erroneous deprivation of a defendant's right to choice
of counsel are speculative, the Court labeled the deprivation a structural
error.9 7 The Court's rationale for its decision was that the choice of one
attorney over another could lead to a myriad of possibilities for the
defendant at trial, including differences in jury selection, theory of the
case, and whether to plea bargain, as well as a host of other possibilities. s
The Court further elaborated on the difference between ineffective
assistance of counsel and the erroneous deprivation of the right to choice
of counsel. In delineating the differences, the Court stated that if a
defendant alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the record will reveal
"identifiable mistakes" that can be used to assess how the trial was
affected.9 9 However, if a defendant's choice of counsel is wrongfully
denied, the best a reviewing court can do to evaluate the effect the
disqualification had on the defendant's trial is to divine which matters
the disqualified counsel would have handled differently.100
The
reviewing court would then need to guess as to the effect the different
choices would have made on the defendant's trial.'' The inability to
identify the method for measuring the effect that the erroneous

91.
92.
93.

Id. at 2563.
Id.
Id. at 2561, 2563.

94. Id.
95. Id. at 2563.
96. 499 U.S. 279, 307-08, 309-10 (1991).
97. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2564.
98. Id. at 2564-65.
99. - Id. at 2565.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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disqualification would have on a criminal defendant weighed heavily on
the Court, which stated simply, "The difficulties of conducting the two
assessments of prejudice [for ineffective assistance of counsel versus
erroneous disqualification] are not remotely comparable."" 2
The Court concluded by reminding lower courts that its holding will
do nothing to limit their authority to schedule trials or to decide whether
to disqualify an attorney. 0 3 Finally, the Court limited its holding only
to those defendants who do not require court-appointed counsel.10"
B.

Justice Alito's Dissent

Justice Alito, along with Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Thomas, wrote a dissent critical of the majority's interpretation
of the Sixth Amendment. First, Justice Alito took issue with the way
the majority characterized the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.' 5
According to the dissenters, the Sixth Amendment's focus is on the
effectiveness of representation a criminal defendant receives at trial, not
"the identity of the provider."0 6 The dissent posited that its interpretation is more in line with the purpose for which the Amendment was
enacted, namely, to dismantle the English common law rule that limited
a criminal defendant's ability to be assisted by counsel.' 7 The dissent
suggested its own holding, writing that in the absence of " ' an identifiable
difference in the quality of representation between the disqualified counsel and the attorney who [actually] represents the defendant at trial,"'
reversal is inappropriate because there has been no violation of the Sixth
Amendment.0 8
Next, the dissent assumed arguendo that the erroneous disqualification of counsel of choice always violates the Sixth Amendment, but
refused to agree that reversal is always required." s Instead, the
dissent suggested that the appropriate remedy for the erroneous
disqualification of counsel is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52(a)," 0 not the Constitution, which does not mandate
remedies for the violations of its provisions. 1 ' Under Rule 52(a), an

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id. at 2565-66.
Id. at 2565.
Id. at 2566 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2566-67.
Id. at 2568 (quoting Rodriguez v. Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 2569.
FED. R. CRiM. P. 52(a).
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2569 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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error2 not affecting a party's substantial rights should be disregard11
ed.
The dissent next speculated that the majority's approach could lead to
the reversal of a defendant's conviction where the second-choice counsel
proved to be better than the first."'
Justice Alito observed the
difference between imposing a back-up attorney on a criminal defendant
and completely denying the defendant the right to be represented by any
counsel."' He noted that the latter is the "epitome of fundamental
unfairness . .. as far as the effect on the outcome is concerned," while
the former may be harmless." 5
The dissent elaborated on this scenario, proposing a hypothetical
situation to illustrate the anomalous outcomes that may result from the
majority's decision." 6 In the hypothetical, a criminal defendant's first
choice of counsel, a person with little criminal law experience, is
erroneously disqualified." 7 The second choice, a nationally acclaimed
criminal defense expert, obtains acquittals for the defendant on most but
not all counts." 8 If the defendant appeals, his conviction will be
automatically reversed, even if he admits that the second attorney
provided better representation than any other attorney in the country
could have provided."' Surely, argued the dissent, such a result could
not be what the Sixth Amendment mandates. 2 °
Finally, the dissent concluded by commenting on the severity of the
consequences the majority's holding will have in the federal court system
and other court systems that disallow defendants from making
interlocutory appeals until a final judgment is entered. 12' Referencing
Flanagan v. United States, 22 the dissent commented that in such
systems, a full trial must first be conducted before the appeal may be
heard.'" If the trial judge erred in disqualifying the defendant's first

112. Id.
113. Id. at 2569.
114. Id. at 2570.
115. Id. Justice Aito mentioned that often the prosecution may not be able to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous disqualification of counsel was harmless.
Nonetheless, he objected to the majority's wholesale elimination of the possibility of proving
harmlessness. Id.
116. Id. at 2570-71.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2571.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 465 U.S. 259 (1984).
123. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2571.
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choice, the appellate court has no 1choice
but to order a new trial,
24
regardless of a showing of prejudice.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

The implications of United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez125 on trial courts
will be felt immediately. First, judges must now take greater care in
deciding whether to disqualify a criminal defendant's chosen counsel.
Formerly, a trial judge had broad discretion to disqualify an attorney
due to scheduling conflicts, ethical violations, and conflicts of interest.
Now, a judge may fear disqualifying too quickly a criminal defendant's
counsel of choice for fear of being reversed on appeal. While the
majority's holding may seem like a good result at first glance, the
Court's decision has in all likelihood created a chilling effect on judges'
ability to exercise their discretion.
Second, the Court's rationale conflicts with its past decisions,
especially Wheat v. United States. 126 In Wheat the Court interpreted
the Sixth Amendment as guaranteeing the right of a criminal defendant
to have an effective advocate. 127 While the Court recognized that the
right to select one's advocate was protected by the Sixth Amendment, the
Court specifically noted in Wheat that the protection of such a right was
not the primary focus of the Amendment. 2 ' However, in GonzalezLopez, the majority specifically disregarded this language and stated
that the "right to select counsel of one's choice ... has been regarded as
the root meaning of the [Sixth Amendment's] constitutional guarantee.""29
'
Anyone reading Wheat with an unbiased view will surely
conclude that this is not how the Court in Wheat interpreted the
protections of the Sixth Amendment.
Third, the Court's decision fails to protect the rights of indigent
criminal defendants. As Justice Scalia noted, the reversal of a conviction
due to the erroneous disqualification of counsel does not apply to those
requiring court-appointed counsel. 3a However, as the Court observed,
the erroneous disqualification of one's lawyer is a structural error that
Absent from the
goes to the heart of the criminal proceeding.''
right
is sacrosanct.
for
why
this
is
any
explanation
opinion
majority's

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006).
486 U;S. 153 (1988).
Id. at 159.
Id.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563 (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159).
Id. at 2565.
Id. at 2564.
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If the right to choose one's counsel is such an integral part of the trial
process that the erroneous disqualification of one's attorney undermines
the trial as a whole, why should this right not apply equally to rich and
poor alike?
Perhaps the issue is one of both convenience and economics. Of
course, those who protested years ago against Gideon's requirement that
all indigent criminal defendants be entitled to legal representation likely
argued that requiring the states to supply all criminal defendants with
legal representation would impose an impossible financial burden on the
states. Nonetheless, because the right to counsel was fundamental, all
states had to protect the right no matter the cost. Thus, if the Court
truly believes that the right to counsel of choice is a fundamental right
worthy of protection, it should be willing to extend that right to all
persons, regardless of the financial imposition.
Clearly, the dissent is more persuasive in light of these considerations.
As noted above, Gonzalez-Lopez's full impact has not yet been fully
realized. Perhaps that is a good thing for the criminal justice system.
JAMES A. ROBSON

